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STATE OF UTAH 
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LEISSEN, Chairman, LA Y T 0 N 
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PETITION FOR REHEARING 
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PETITION FOR REHEARJNG 
To the Honorable Supreme Court of the State of rtah: 
The above case was reversed hy your Honorable 
body upon the ground of absence of evidence to support 
the verdict for two general reasons: 
1. That the expert witnesses who testified for de-
fendants fixed the value of the property by finding the 
product of the total tons of sand and gravel times the 
price per ton; and 
2. That compensation for the property was fixed 
upon the basis of the equivalent of the total profits which 
would be realized from future operations of the property, 
instead of upon its actual present value in place. 
\Ve respectfully submit that the above propositions 
are not factually correct as shown by the record. We 
further submit that no such supposed errors were 
advanced by the plaintiff either in the reeord on appeal, 
or covered by the points argued on appeal, or presented 
to the trial court for its determination by motion for a 
ne\Y trial prior to appeal, and were, therefore, not prop-
erly before this Court for its detennination on appeal. 
The following points are respectfully submitted in 
support of a rehearing: 
POINT I 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE 
JURY WERE CORRE.CT STATEMENTS OF THE LAW IN 
THE POINTS AT ISSUE. 
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POINT II 
THE OPINION ASSUMES THAT THE VALUE FIXED 
BY THE WITNESSES UPON THE GRAVEL AREA IN-
CLUDED A PROFl T: WHEREAS THE EVIDENCE OF THE 
VALUE OF THE SAND AND GRAVEL WAS BASED UPON 
WORTH IN PLACE AND NOT UPON RESALE VALUE OF 
THE REMOVED GRAVEL. THE METHOD OF VALUATION 
USED BY THE WITNESSES IS SUPPORTED BY OPINION 
OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS IN THREE 
DIFFERENT CIRCUITS. 
POINT III 
THE JURY'S VERDICT CAN BE CONSTRUED AS 
AWARDING ONLY ABOUT ONE-THIRD THE VALUE OF 
SAND AND GRAVEL PLACED BY THE WITNESSES; 
THEREBY LEAVING OVER ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN 
THOUSAND ($118,000.00) DOLLARS "PROFIT" FOR A PUR-
CHASER. 
POINT IV 
THE OPINION FAILS TO GIVE PROPER .CONSIDER-
ATION TO THE FINDINGS OF THE JURY. 
POINT V 
RESPONDENT'S CASE IS SIMILAR TO AND SUP-
PORTED BY FAMOUS NEW YORK CASE, CITED BY 
ORGEL BEFORE FINAL DECISION UPON FINAL APPEAL. 
POINT VI 
CASES CITED IN THE OPINION OF THE COURT ARE 
DISTINGUISHABLE FROM FACTS OF THE INSTANT 
CASE. 
POINT VII 
THE APPELLANT HAVING FAILED TO OBJECT TO 
EVIDENCE OR INSTRUCTIONS PERTAINING TO THE 
SAND & GRAVEL AT TRIAL, THE APPELLATE COURT 
SHOULD NOT CONBIDER OBJECTIONS RAISED FOR 
FIRST TIME UPON APPEAL. 
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POINT VIII 
RESPONDENTS RESPECTFULLY REQUEST INFOR-
MA'riON UPON INQUIRIES. 
POINT IX 
THE TRIAL COURT DENIED A MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL AND ENTERED JUDGMENT UPON THE VERDICT. 
ARGl'.\1ENT 
POINT I 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE 
JURY WERE CORRECT STATEMENTS OF THE LAW IN 
THE POINTS AT ISSUE. 
The trial court directed the jury as follows: 
lndruction X o. 7. "lou are not to consider 
what the property ·was worth to the defendants 
for speculation, or Inerely for possible uses, nor 
what they claim it \\~as worth to them, nor can you 
consider what it 1nay be worth to plaintiff for 
highway purposes, nor what the property would 
bring at a forced sale, you ·are not to consider the 
price the property would sell for under special or 
extraordinary circumstances, but only its fair 
market value on July ~:2, 1955, if offered in the 
1narket under ordinary eircun1stanees for c-ash, 
a reasonable time being given to 1nake the sale." 
lnstructiou So. 10. ··~\s to the meaning of 
.. .:\[ arket Yalue," the 1narket Yalue of property 
taken for public- use is the price esti1nated in terms 
of money which the property would bring if of-
fered for sale in the open 1narket with a reason-
able ti1ne allowed in which to find a purchaser, 
buying with the knowledge of all the uses and 
purposes to whic-h jt was adapted .and for which 
it was capable; or as otherwise stated, it is the 
price the property will bring when offered for sale 
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by one who desires, but is not required, to sell, 
and is sought by one who has the cash, and who 
desires, but is not required, to buy, after due con-
sideration of all the elements reasonably affecting 
value.'' 
lnstrnction No. 20. "The defendants were 
entitled to sell the land and buildings on the 
theory that said land could be used for the best 
and most profitable purpose or purposes, for 
which it was adapted. They could have sold it on 
the theory that it w.as usable for several purposes, 
but you nmst consider or assume that the entire 
tract of land, including the frontage, trailer 
courts, antique store, and sand and gravel de-
posits, would have sold to one man for whatever 
use or uses he could make of it. 
''You may not consider uncertain, remote or 
speculative, or imaginary uses, but only those 
elements which give the property a market value, 
or which reduce its market value. One wa~- to do 
it would be to suppose a sale by a \villing seller 
to a willing buyer, neither one being forced into 
the transaction, the buyer having the money to 
huy, and then detennine what he would have paid 
for it in the light of all of the evidence in this 
case.'' 
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED ON BEHALF OF THE DE-
FENDANTS CONFORMED WITH THE COURT'S INSTRUC-
TIONS. 
1. 1 t fixed th~ use and value of the propert~- for 
business purposes, as of the date 0f occupaney h~- the 
Stat€'. 
~- It fixed the value of the buildings in plaee .as of 
said date. 
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3. It fixed the amount of sand and gravel in the 
gravel pit of said property and the value of the same 
in place as of the date of occupancy. 
THE EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENDANTS DID NOT 
PRESUPPOSE THAT THE PURCHASER WOULD "RE-
QUIRE MANY YEARS IN DISPOSING OF THE SAND AND 
GRAVEL TO RECOVER BACK THE FULL ESTIMATED 
PURCHASE PRICE IF IT 'WERE RECOVERABLE AT ALL'' 
AS YOUR HONORABLE BODY DECLARED. 
POINT II 
THE OPINION ASSUMES THAT THE VALUE FIXED 
BY THE WITNESSES UPON THE GRAVEL AREA IN-
CLUDED A PROFIT: WHEREAS THE EVIDENCE OF THE 
VALUE OF THE SAND AND GRAVEL WAS BASED UPON 
WORTH IN PLA·CE AND NOT UPON RESALE VALUE OF 
THE REMOVED GRAVEL. THE METHOD OF VALUATION 
USED BY THE WITNESSES IS SUPPORTED BY OPINION 
OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS IN THREE 
DIFFERENT CIRCUITS. 
\Ve respectfully cite to the court the case of N atioMl 
Brick Co. v. United States, 76 U.S. App. D.C. 3~9. 131 
F. 2d 30 which ·was quoted in part in respondent's brief, 
but is set forth here in its entirety: 
131 Federal Reporter, 2nd Series 
NATIONAL BRICK CO vs. "CXITED STATES 
Xo. 8047 
United States Court of App€als for the 
District of Columbia 
Argued Oct. 5, 1942 
Decided Oct. 26, 1942 
1. l~Ininent D01nain 202- ( 4), 252 ( 5) 
In proceeding to conden1n said land owned 
by brick c01npany, rejection of testimony of com-
pany's manager and one engaged in business of 
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buying and selling sand as to value of land for 
sand contained therein was harmful error re-
quiring reversal of judgment on jury's a\v.ard of 
lesser amount, especially in view of judge's state-
ment limiting appraisal to value of land as real 
estate, though subsequent witness testified as to 
value of land .as sand bank. 
2. :f:1~minent Domain 134 
In proceeding to condemn land, special value 
thereof due to its adaptability for use in particu-
lar business is an element which owner is entitled 
to have considered in determining amount to be 
paid in just compensation thereof. 
3. Eminent Domain 202(4) 
In proceeding to condemn said land owned by 
brick cornpany, testimony as to quantity and qual-
ity of sand and its value in its natural condition 
in bank at time of taking was .admissible to enable 
jury to apply correct standard of value of land 
with regard to best use thereof. 
+. Eminent Domain 202(4) 
In proceeding to condemn sand land owned 
by company using sand in manufacturing bricks 
or selling it to contractors for making of building 
mortar, inquiry should have been whether prop-
erty was valuable in open market for sale of sand 
or use thereof in making bricks, and jury should 
have been informed by competent witnes.-;ps en-
gaged in sand business as to quantity and quality 
of sand, uses to which it might be put, existence of 
market therefor, and value of land with sand on 
such market in its then condition. 
Appeal fron1 the District Court of the United 
States for the District of Columbia. 
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Proceeding by the United States to condemn 
land owned by the National Brick Company. From 
a judgrnent on a jury's award of compensation, 
the landowner appeals. 
Reversed and remanded for new trial. 
~fessrs. Edwin C. Dutton and Richard E. 
\Vellford, both of \Yashington, D.C. for appellant. 
:.Mr. J·ohn P. I-Iearne, of the Bar of the state 
of ralifornia, pro hac vice, by special leave of 
Court with whom Norman l\L Littell, Assistant 
Attorney General and "J[essrs. Yernon L. \Vilkin-
son and Alexander 1-I. Bell, Jr., all of \Y ashington, 
D.C. were on brief, for appellee. -:\Iessrs. Charles 
R. Denny, Jr., and Dwight H. Doty, both of Wash-
ington, D.C. entered appearances for the Appellee. 
Before GRO:\T~R, Chief Justice, and :MIL-
LER and YIXSOX, Associate Justices. 
GHOXER, C. J. 
This is an appeal by a landowner in a con-
demnation proceeding instituted b~T the rnited 
States to acquire lands for the ro.ad development 
program of the X ational Capital Parks, Parkway 
and Playground ~ystem. The property inYolved 
consists of two and a half acres of a thirty-one 
acre tract of land adjoining the Baltirnore & Ohio 
Railroad right of way in the District of Columbia. 
Appellant aequired the tract .about thirty years 
ago and constructed on a part of it a plant for 
making brick. The plant ha~ been in operation 
continnonsl~-. and during the entire thirty years 
brick and s.and haYe been sold to builder~ in the 
District of Colun1bia and Yicinity. Of the acreage 
of the entire tract about one-fifth is denon1inated 
''sand land,'' and the particular two and a half 
.acre's taken hy the United States is a solid sand 
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bank sloping frmn a height of forty to ninety feet 
above the level of the adjoining railroad tracks. 
The bank contains approximately 300,000 cubic 
yards of sand, weighing approxirnately 450,000 
tons. Appellant valued the land taken at $67,500. 
The jury awarded $9,000. 
(1) The record does not include the plead-
ings and the evidence is condensed to a degree 
that makes it difficult to determine precisely what 
occurred at the trial, but enough appears, we 
think, to show that error was committed by the 
Court in the rejection of material evidence. 
At the trial _Jf r Dalley, a part owner of the 
property and manager of the Brick Company 
testified that the most valuable use to which the 
two and one-half acres proposed to be taken could 
be put w.as the manufacture of brick and the sale 
of sand to contractors for making building mor-
tar, that the property adjacent to it had been so 
used during the past thirty years, and that the 
sale of sand was on a per ton basis, appellant 
either rnaking delivery at building operations in 
the District of Colurnbia, or permitting the pur-
chaser to remove the same from the hank into 
his own trucks. 
He testified "that the value of the land for 
the sand contained therein was $67,500, "which 
testimony, on motion of the United States, was 
stricken out, because he has estimated the value 
by the value of the sand per ton.'' 
Another \vitness, vVilliam Ohrey Steel, who 
is engaged in the District of Columbia in the busi-
ness of selling sand and operating a sand pit, was 
asked to testify to the value of the sand per ton 
"in the bank just as it is now." On objection by 
the United. States, the Court refused to allow the 
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witness to answer. Again, he was asked "Have 
you bought sand of the same quality as the sand 
contained in this two and a half acres?" He an-
swered that he had. lie was then asked what he 
had paid for it. An objeotion to this question was 
sustained, whereupon a colloquy among counsel 
and the Court ensued, during the cour.se of which 
the judge remarked to counsel for the land-
owner: "You are entitled to get the fair market 
value of your property for land as real estate. 
That is what you are entitled to. You are trying 
to get most everything but that." 
The same witness was thereupon asked 
whether, in view of his experience with "sand 
land'' and in the purchase of sand, he wa.s in a 
position to state what the fair Inarket value of 
this particular land was at the present time. This 
question too, the Court refused to allow to be 
answered, stating to counsel: "He (the witness) 
i.s not the owner. The owner can testify to this 
opinion of its value, but he isn't a real estate man. 
You know that just as well as I do." 
It is quite true that a subsequent ,,..-Jtness was 
permitted to answer most of these que.stions .and 
to testify that the property as a sand bank was 
worth $25,000 or $30,000 an acre. But in spite 
of this, we think sufficient harm had been done by 
the rejection of proper evidence of value, coupled 
with the Judge's statement limiting the appraisal 
to the value .as real estate, to leave the jury be-
wildered as to the proper elements to be taken 
into consideration in ascertaining the fair Inarket 
value of the property. 
Obviously, the Court was originally of opin-
ion that the presence on the property of the sand 
bank forty to ninety feet high, containing 300,000 
10 
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cubic yards of pure sand w:as of no consequence 
in determining the value of the property taken, 
and that the added value hy reason of the pres-
ence of the sand should not be considered. On 
this theory most of the evidence of the additional 
value of the sand in the bank as it was .and of the 
additional value of the property hy reason of 
presence of the sand was rejected. 
(2) This opinion of the Court was, of course, 
wrong, for no rule is better established than that 
the special value of land due to its adaptability 
for use in a particular business is an element 
which the owner of land is entitled to have con-
sidered in determining the amount to be paid in 
just compensation 
So much as this was said by the Supreme 
Court in Mitchell v. rnited States, 267 l'.S. 341, 
45 S. Ct. 293, 69 L. Ed. 644. And we know of no 
other evidence hy which the jury could be proper-
ly guided in determining the value of the propert~­
than to be told the per ton value of the property 
than to be told the sand as it lay, or, without this 
knowledge, how the jury could have reached a 
judgment based on anything more than guess or 
speculation. 
(3) Counsel for appellant was not seeking 
to prove the profit derived from the sale of the 
sand, or the value or price of the sand after it 
had been taken out of the bank In questioning 
these witnesses he was seeking to show the vahw 
of the land with regard to the bes~t use that could 
be made of it. This is the standard hy \vhich the 
jury was to n1ake an award. In order that they 
might apply this standard it was necessary that 
they know the quantity and quality of the sand 
and its value at the time of taking in its natural 
11 
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condition in the bank. Counsel's que.stions wer.e 
confined to these issues. :\Iontana Ry. Co. v. 
\Varren, 137 U.S. 348, 11 S. Ct. 96, 34 L. Ed. 681. 
See, also, :Manning v. City of Lowell, 173 Mass. 
100, 53 N.E. 160; Creighton v. Board of Com'rs. 
143 N.C. 171, 55 S.E. 511, 10 Ann. Cas. 218; Sav-
ings & Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 229 Pa. 
484, 78 A. 131. 
In the leading case of Boom Co. v. P.atter.son, 
98 U.S. 403, 408, 25 L. Ed. 206, the Court held that 
the adaptability of lands located in the Mississippi 
• River for a logging boom ·was a proper element in 
estimating their value. It was there said: "So 
many and v.aried are the circu1nstances to be 
taken into account in determining the value of 
property condemned for public purposes, that it 
is perhaps impossible to formulate a rule to gov-
ern its appraisement in all cases. Exceptional cir-
cumstances will rnodify the most carefully guard-
ed rule; but, .as a general thing, we 8hould say 
that the compensation to the owner is to be esti-
rnated by reference to the uses for which the prop-
erty is suitable, having regard to the existing busi-
ness or wants of the cmnmunity, or such a~ may 
be reasonably expected in the immediate future." 
What is already said receives .additional em-
phasis from the fact that the Governrnent's ·wit-
nesses in this case \Yere real estate rnen \Yho testi-
fied in the n1ain in rPlation to the value of the 
land for real estate developrnent and who, when 
asked about the added value of the sand bank 
treated it as an encurnbranee which w .. ould have 
to be removed for building operations rather than 
as an added value to the land. 
James \Y. Campbell, the single witne:;;s of the 
Governrnent who was in the sand business, eon-
12 
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fined himself on the subject of value to the state-
ment that he had .a ten years' supply of sand on 
hand and for that reason he had not inquired as 
to other sources of sand supply or their value. 
But he and the other witnesses for the Govern-
ment were permitted to state what in their opin-
ion was the value of the land for real estate de-
velopment purposes alone. 
( 4) We think the inquiry should have been 
whether the property was valuable in the open 
marke1t for the sale of sand or for the use of sand 
in the making of bricks, and that in order to re.aeh 
a fair conclusion in this respect the jury should 
have been informed hy competent witnesses as to 
the quantity of the sand, the quality of the sand, 
the uses to which it might be put, whether there 
was a market for it, and the value of the land with 
the sand in that market in its then condition. 
Reversed and remanded for a new trial in ac-
cordance with this opinion. 
The testimony of :Mr. Schoenfeld (R 217-239) as 
smwnarized in the Respondent's Brief at page 5 and 6 
shows that in fixing the value of the sand and gravel at 
25c and 1 Oc per ton respectively, the witness considered 
the value of the sand and gravel as it lay in place; that 
the fine sand conld be delivered for sale .at 90c per ton 
after payment of costs of loading and hauling of 35c pPr 
ton lea,ving a gTo:-;s profit of 55c per ton. In the interest 
of hreYity, the attention of the court is respectfully in-
vited to the citations in the Respondent's Brief, and the 
record for the testimony of Mr. Schoenfeld in connection 
with the value of the material together with the great 
demand and market for the material, espeeiall~· hy rea-
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son of the proximity of the Noble property to the market 
for said products. The jury had the benefit of :\f r. 
Schoenfeld's testimony both on direct and cross examin-
ation concerning costs and profit and were fully advised 
that the value established by Mr. Schoenfeld for the 
products in place included no profit. 
The opinion indicates some concern with the state-
rnent of ).fr. ~ oble that it may have taken him 15 years 
to sell the 1nuck sand. \Ye respectfully submit that a 
"willing buyer" would fair better selling the sand over 
a 15 year period, because of the greater advantage in-
cmne tax "\vise, and in view of the nearness of this 
property to the growing market, when according to the 
testi1nony, the location of the X oble property with re-
speet to the market and dernand results in a saving im-
mediately of from 35c to $1.00 per ton hauling costs 
from the next nearest sources. The "'willing buyer" is 
also apprised that there is only one crop of sand and 
gravel; that the largest operator in the area, Utah Sand 
& Gravel has already depleted its supply in that vicinity; 
that of all cornmodities which 1nay be rendered obsolete, 
sand and gravel would seern to be one of the last minerals 
to fall from the rnarket and that the passage of tin1e in 
the face of a din1inishing supply would serve to advance 
the value of the sand and gravel. 
POINT III 
THE JURY'S VERDICT CAN BE CONSTRUED AS 
AWARDING ONLY ABOUT ONE-THIRD THE VALUE OF 
SAND AND GRAVEL PLACED BY THE WITNESSES; 
THEREBY LEAVING OVER ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN 
THOUSAND ($118,000.00) DOLLARS "PROFIT" FOR A PUR-
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CHASER. 
The jury had testimony of the Respondent's witness 
supporting the verdict as follows: 
Frontage, 595 feet at each $75.00 ________ $ 44,625.00 
Improvements ------------------------------- _________ 40,999.00 
85,624.00 
Sand and Gravel area -------------------------- 183,269.10 
$268,893.10 
The jury, by finding the whole tract to be worth 
$150,000.00, in effect, may have assigned only $64,376.00 
to the sand and gravel computed as follows: 
Total value ----------------------------------------------$150,000.00 
Frontage and improvements ______________ 85,624.00 
Yalue of sand .and gravel area____________ 64,376.00 
The value assigned to the gravel area by the jury 
was about one-third of that testified to by the Respon-
dent':;; witnesses, which left a margin for a prospective 
buyer of $118,893.10, based upon value in place. The 
value of the sand and gravel area if based upon retail 
or incidental sales after re1noval was much greater as 
te~tified by Mr. Schoenfeld. 
POINT IV 
THE OPINION FAILS TO GIVE PROPER ·CONSIDER-
ATION TO THE FINDINGS OF THE JURY. 
The trial of this cause continued for a period of 
about -:P/~ days during which time the jury considered 
testimony as set forth in over 400 pages of record, and 
viewed the premises which then consisted mainly of the 
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debris of the removed buildings .and the gravel area. 
The jury could find it quite significant that both the 
witnesses for the Appellant and Respondent used similar 
methods by which to arrive at a market value in that 
these witnesses from the business world would be pur-
suing the subject the same as the prospective purchaser, 
who, hirnself would know no other way of determining 
the value of the land. If, in fact, the witnesses did mis-
conceive the method by which the value of the gravel 
area was to be determined, the jury, by its reduced ver-
dict cannot, itself, be deemed to have arrived at its ver-
dict other than in the proper manner. 
The finding of the jury that the whole of the X oble 
property was worth $150,000.00 is consistent with the 
proposition that the jury only consider quality, quantity, 
and price of the sand in arriving at the value of the land 
with the sand in it. There is no indication that the jury 
1nuJtiplied quantity of sand by price per ton in arriving 
at its verdict. 
This court has on many occasions expressed itself 
on the regard to be given to the verdict of the trier of 
fact: 
In the case of vVilson YS. rlroid, 1 rtah Second, 
:~G~, 2G7 P ~d 759, the court held: 
( 5) ''The que~tion of dmnages in such in-
stance seems best addre~sPd to the discretion of a 
jur~·; they haYe hmues, spouses and children of 
their own, are experienced in the practical affairs 
of daily life, and lwYe different points of Yiew: 
and they are afforded the benefit of seeing and 
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hearing the parties and their witnesses. Because 
of their advantaged position courts are extremely 
reluctant to interfere with their verdicts. This 
is necessarily so in order that the right of trial 
by jury assured under our law9 be preserved. If 
courts were prone to set aside jury verdicts and 
substitute their own judgments therefor when-
ever they disagreed with the jun·, the right would 
be abrogated and the jury s~·stem would be but 
a pretense. The concept of trial h~' jury neces-
sarily presupposes that there is a wide area with-
in which the pendulum of the jury's deliberations 
may swing without interference from the court. 
And ~o long as they remain within the boundaries 
of what reasonable minds could believe their 
findings should remain inviolate. 
(7) "The validity of the verdict in the in-
stant case is reinforced hy the fact that the trial 
judge has given his approval hy refusing to va-
cate or modify it. As we stated in Geary v. 
Cain,11 ' ••• in case of doubt, the deliberate action 
of the trial court should prevail. Otherwise thi~ 
court will sooner or later find itself usurping the 
functions of both the jtu~, and the trial court, .. ' " 
X asner Y. Burton et al, 2 Ftah 2d 236, 272 P. 2d 163 
held "This being a law case and Plaintiff having pre-
vailed, h(~ i:;; entitled to the benefit of the evidence in 
the light most favorable to him, together with every 
inferenee and intendment fairly and reasonably arising 
therefrom." 
.John C. Cutler Association v. De.Jay Ston·~, 3 l'tah 
2d 107 270 P. 2d 700, the court held: "The defendant, 
De;ht~·, having prevailed is entitled to have us view the 
evidence .and every fair inference and intendment arising 
therefrom in the light most favorable to it. And if when 
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so regarded, there is any substantial evidence, or, as 
sometimes stated, any reasonable basis in the evidence 
to support the finding made by the trial court, it will not 
be disturbed." 
Bowden v. Denver and Rio Grande Western Rail-
road Co. 3 Utah 2d 444, 286 P. 2d 240: 
'~There is a most important difference be-
tween this case and the Butz case hereinabove dis-
cussed. In the latter, the trial court had deprived 
the plaintiff of a trial by jury and resolved all 
of the j ssues of fact against him as a matter of 
law, whereas in this case the 1natter was sub-
mitted to a jury .and the facts were found against 
the plaintiff. "\\-r e reaffirm our eomrnitJnent that 
a_rhe right of jury trial ... is ... a right so funda-
mental and sacred to the citizen ... (that it) 
should be jealously guarded by the courts.~·' But 
once having been granted such right and a ver-
dict rendered, it should not be regarded lightly 
nor overturned '"-ithout good and sufficient rea-
son; nor should a judgment be disturbed merely 
because of error. Only when there is error both 
substantial and prejudicial, and when there is 
a reasonable likelihood that the re.sult would 
have been different without it, should error be 
regarded as sufficient to upset a judgment or 
grant a new trial." 
Taylor Y. \Yeber County, -! rtah 2d 3:2~. 293 P. 2d. 
925: 
"'This being a law action and the jury having 
found the issues in f.avor of the defendant, they 
are entitled to have us consider all the evidence, 
and every inference and intendment fairly aris-
ing therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
defendant. 
18 
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"The evidence as revealed by the record is 
conflicting, but was found under the courts in-
structions to · be clear and s.atisfactory in the 
defendants favor. The jury saw and heard all of 
the ·witnesses, viewed the premises, and examined 
the exhibits. Since the evidence amply sustains 
the verdict, we are not disposed to overturn it 
unless it -vvas rendered under instruction, con-
stituting prejudicial error." 
Has the respondent been accorded the benefit of the 
evidence .and every fair inference and intendment arising 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the respondent J 
In addition to the evidence summarized in the briefs, and 
in this petition, we respectfull,,- urge the court's consid-
eration of the following excerpts from the testimony 
which indicate that the jury was not acting under any 
misconception of fact or la \\' in arriving at its verdict. 
~1R. NOBLT~: (H. 170) 
Q. T still do not get an answer to m:: question, 
:\Jr. N able. I want to know how you got the 
$200,000.00 figure value on your gravel. 
_\. \Vell, in the first place, I could take it out 
1nyself and get a lot more out of it than that. 
Q. T am not interested in that. 
A. I could sell all my gravel 1 could get, con-
siderably more than that-worth consjderabl,\T 
more than that. (169). 
Q. How long would it take :-ou to sell that at 
24,000 tons a year ~ 
A. Well, I don't know, l would have to figure a 
little bit. 
Q. It would take quite a while, wouldn't :·ou? 
A. I don't know. 1 would have to sell it that "·ay. 
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Q. How fast could YOU sell it'? 
A. I do not know, 'that depends on the market. 
I wouldn't have to be in an,\~ hurry if I owned 
the land. 
::\f r. Sdto(·nfeld, after testifying that the fine sand 
was worth 25e per ton jn place and the gravel worth lOc 
per ton in plaee (It 222), and that the proxi1nity of the 
N ohle property to the Salt Lake market results in a sav-
ing~ of fron1 :2;)r to 30c a ton hauling costs if the material 
had to be hauled frmu Bountiful, the next nearest source, 
(R. 2:2;)) and that he rdails the sarid at 90c per ton at 
Salt Lake Cit~·, (H. 226), then under cross examination 
gave answers to questions as follows: 
BY ~IH. BUDGE: 
Q. ~r r. Schoenfeld, let's get thi~ figured no,v. \Ye 
are starting out with a figure of 90 cents, you 
say :23 to haul it, that leayes 65 cents. You 
say it costs 10 rent:-; to load it, that leaYes 55 
cents. X ow I an1 interested in how much does 
the rrtaterial cost: what do you pay for the 
1naterial? 
A. \\Thieh I stated there, I would pay :25 cents a 
ton. 
Q. Are you leasing presently, ).f r. Schoenfeld-
are you leasing property presently? 
A. Yes, I am. 
Q. .\n) you pa:·inu: ~;) cents a ton. in place, for 
~~our 1naterial? 
A. No, I am not. 
Q. \\~hat are you paying? 
A. 10 cents-I run pa~-ing 10 cents. 
Q. But you would be willing to pay :23 cents. is 
that right? 
A. For that 1nuck sand. yes. 
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Q. You are not paying 25 cents now, though, you 
are paying 10 cents 1 
A. I havenjt got .any muck sand. It isn't cleaned 
Q. 
off, if there was any. I an1 taking a virgin 
mountain, and have to do all of the exploring. 
That's right, absolutely right, and you know 
under the terms of your le,ase, you pay so 
1nuch .a yard for the material removed; now 
have you agreed to pay 25 cents for muck 
sand, if there is any there, and you remove 
it; have you 1 
A. I would on that-
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
I did not ask you that. I said under your 
present lease you are paying 10 cents. 
Paying 10 cents for s.and and gravel. 
\Vhether sand or gravel, you are going to get 
it for 10 cents? 
A. For ten cents. 
Q. That is what I want to know. I don't want 
any evasion here. I want this jury to know 
what the true facts .are. 
So now we can take that 10 cents off the 
55 cents; that leaves you 45 cents. That would 
be a profit-is that what you are telling us 1 
A. That's right. 
Q. And you would not have any bu.siness over-
head connected with it~ 
.:-\. All you would have is your bookkeeping. 
Q. A bookkeeper; that is something, isn't it'! 
That would cost you something wouldn't it? 
A. Yes, that would cost something. 
Q. Is there any other expense~ 
A. No. 
Q. You don't have to carry insurance ? 
A. That's right, hiring it done. 
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Q. All right, you don't have insurance. Do you 
have any equip1nent at all~ 
A. You don't if you hired it done. 
Q. How do you ge~t it loaded? 
A. You can get it loaded for 10 cents a ton, as 
I told you. They will load it for 10 cents a 
ton all over the country. 
Q. You don't take into consideration any equip-
rnent of any kind then, at all, and no other 
expenses than that. 
A. I can't see where there would be, no. 
Q. .How about w.ages; wages would c01ne out of 
your profits? 
· A. Which would be a very good profit. 
Q. I-Iow 1nuch muck sand could you load all by 
yourself out of one of those pits and make 
45 cents a ton on it? 
A. Well, we have tested that out, with a tractor. 
loading 200 tons, an hour. 
Q. I thought you did not have equip1nent now! 
A. I am stating this: I hired it done. 
Q. vV e .are trying to find out where the -t3 cents 
goes ; how much is profit. 
A. \ V e load 200 tons. 
Q. How many n1en do you have to load 200 tons 
an hour? 
A. One n1an. 
Q. One 1nan, no loading machine; how do you get 
it up in the trucks 1 
A. vVith that loading traetor. with that piece of 
equipment. 
Q. That costs sOinething don't it: how n1uch did 
that tr:actor cost ? 
A. $18,000. 
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Q. $18,000; then somebody has got to be paid for 
that, don't they, out of the· profit~ 
A. I can hire it loaded and let mine set, and get 
it unloaded for 10 cents. Therefore, the cost 
wouldn't be any more if I loaded it myself 
than if I hire it loaded. 
Q. You wouldn't even have to go out there at all; 
you can stay home and get thatf 
A. That's right, I could. 
Q. You would not even have to keep track of how 
much they took out 1 
A. ~ o, the ticket machine would tell me. 
~Ir. Hi<leont ( !{. ~S~)) to (R. ~87) expressed his 
opinion that tlw market value of the property based 
upon the idea that fair market value of the property is 
\Vhat a ·willing lmyer \vho had the me.ans to do so, and 
,,·ho \\·a~n 't under pre:-;~nre, \Vould pay to a willing seller, 
\\·ho desired to :-;ell his property and wasn't under pres-
:'Ure to sell it. ~lr. Rideout based his opinion in part upon 
the expert opinion of others. As to this method of arriv-
ing at an opinion, \Yhigmore has this to say. "There is 
no mysterious logical fatality in basing 'one expert opin-
ion upon another.'; it is done every day and business and 
applied seienre." ( :inl lDd. Supplement adds) : "For that 
matter, in ~·very day trials factual opinions or conclu-
~ion~ of both lay and expert witnesses are utilized in 
hypothetical questions." ( 1 \\~higmore Evidence 2d Ed. 
Sec. 682, p. 1093). 
\Vhigmore, 3d Ed. Vol. III, Sec. 720, after stating 
that knowledge of the thing to be valued is a requirement 
~ays 
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"As with other kinds of knowledge (Ante Sec. 
672) so with knowledge of values, the place of this 
element rnay be supplied by hypothetical question. 
Thus, where a witness is competent to speak of 
house values, but has not seen the house in ques-
tion, the specifications and other particulars may 
be placed before him hypothetically for an opin-
ion, and then his knowledge of the value-standard 
may become available; or in some cases, his at-
tention may be called to .a thing assun1ed to be 
substantially similar to that in question and his 
judgn1ent may be given on the hypothesis of simi-
larity, this hypothetical basis is legitimately and 
frequently employed as a substitute for actual 
o bserv.a tion." 
~Ir. J(iepe (H. 389) 
Q. And what were your findings-do you have 
an opinion as to the value of fine sand, n1uck 
sand and blending sand, or do you have an 
opinion as to the value of that~ 
A. I have an opinion as to what the materials, 
which are "'ithin that area excavation would 
be worth. 
Q. You obtained that frmn, I suppose also, sales 
of cmnparable 1naterial in the .area: that went 
into your consideration f 
A. Yes, the prices sand and g-raYel n1en are pay-
ing for 1naterials in place. 
Q. \Vhat do you think is a fair 1narket price for 
1nuck s.and and 1nixing sand or blending sand, 
in place~ 
A. rrhe price I put on this 1naterial, was at the 
rate of ten cents a cubic yard. 
Q. Ten cents a cubic yard-what price did you 
put on the graye], l\fr. ICiepe? 
"A. That is all of that. 
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Q. You say 10 cents 1 
A. Overburden, sand and gravel, all materials 
lying above the level of the highway, I have 
given an average price of ten cents. 
Q. In place, ten cents~ 
A. Yes. 
~r r. Solomon (R. 481) : 
Q. \Vhat do yon find to be the fair market price 
for these materials as of that date, as you 
have determined~ 
A. Front my investigation, in my opinion, that 
1nuck sand is worth 10 cents per cubic yard, in 
place, and overburden, 4 cents per cubic yard, 
in place. 
Q. And did you check at various locations, and 
upon various instru1nents to figure those 
uses~ 
A. I checked with operators who were buying 
and selling such products, .also with the mar-
ket. 
POINT V 
RESPONDENT'S CASE IS SIMILAR TO AND SUP-
PORTED BY FAMOUS NEW YORK CASE, CITED BY 
ORGEL BEFORE FINAL DECISION UPON FINAL APPEAL. 
The opinion quotes from Orgel on .... raluation rnder 
Eminent Domain," 4th Addition, page~ 541 to ;)47. It is 
to be noted that the Pntire quotation from Orgel is taken 
under the chapter titled ''Bu~inP~s Profits" as EYidence 
of Yalue." Orgel and tlw opinion C'iti· two X<'w York 
cases, Orleans County Query Co. v. ~tat<>, 17:2 App. Div. 
868, 159 K.Y.~. 30 (1916), and Sparkhill Realty Corp. v. 
State, 268 K.Y. 192, 197, N.E. 1~J~ (1935). The Stl(lrklii11 
Realty Corp. 1:. Strtte case was litigated over a period of 
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about 10 years and w.as finally concluded by an opinion 
rendered April 27, 1938 by the Supreme Court, Appellate 
Division, of N e·w York, 4 N.Y.S. 2d 679, which opinion 
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of New York, 279 
N.Y. 656, 18 N.E. 2d 301. The property comprised about 
16-1 acres of which 110 acres were upland containing de-
posits of Trap rock and the remaining 54 acres were 
1narsh lands. The first award was for $1,650,000.00; up-
on retrial there wa_s an identical award. The third award, 
based upon a referee's report to the lower court was 
$1,333,209.00, together with interest of $630,830.00. The 
previous judg1nents had been reversed and remanded for 
new trial for the reason that the value was established 
by expert witnesses who based their opinions upon the 
anticipated profits to be derived from the operation 
of a quarry which had not yet been placed into opera-
tion. \Ve quote now certain excerpts from the opinion 
of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in 1938, 
4 K.Y.S. 2d 679: 
·•That judg1nent under review should not be 
disturbed unless it clearly appears that it included 
unlawful, or excluded lawful, ele1nents of damage, 
or unless it is tainted \\-ith un1nistakable legal 
error .. The value of property taken in eondenma-
tion proceedings i~ a question of fact (case cited). 
It is settled he)·ond question that respondents 
.are entitled to reeoYer the fair 1narket value of 
their property based on the most advantageous 
use to which it eould be put. In thi~ ca~e appellant 
occupies the status of a purchaser ~cases eited). 
In order to arrive at an esti1nate of fair 1narket 
'~alue of the property in question, all those things 
which would be eonsidered by a buyer and seller, 
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neither under compulsion, neither having an ad-
vantage over the other, 1nust be taken into con-
sideration by a witness competent to assemble, 
weigh and translate them into dollars and cents. 
All the facts and circumstances which a buver and 
seller would consider in connection with the pur-
ehase and sale of a piece of property are relevant 
and material in arriving at a detennination as to 
it:;; market value. Exceptional circumstances exist 
in this case. The property which is the subject of 
this litigation -- a quarry and an uncompleted 
plant-is not the subject of barter and sale in 
any general market and obviously its value is not 
to be determined upon evidence relevant in eases 
involving residc>n('e, business or similar propert~·. 
B....,air value in this instance, neither being under 
duress, is the sum of money a willing purchaser 
of such a plant and quarry \v·ould p.ay, and a will-
ing seller would accept. \Vhen the state deprives 
a citizen of his property for publie use, he should 
have the right to prove every element that ean 
fairly enter into the question of market value 
(eases cited) * * * The respondents swore three 
expert witnesses on the question of value. To dis-
euss the evidence in detail would extend our views 
beyond reasonable limits. We shall therefor, but 
briefly refer to the testimony. In respon.se to a 
hypothetical question, one of these witnesses fixed 
the value of the respondent's property at the time 
of appropriation at $1,946,528.70; another at $1,-
996,529.00 and the third at between $1,996,529.00 
and $2,496,529. Appellant eritieizes this evidence 
and argues that it is based upon concjecture as to 
profits and that the data upon which the wit-
nesses relied are speculative and conjectural and 
that consequently the responses of the witne.sse.s 
ar based upon an assumption of a fixed annual 
profit from the quarry operations. \Ve cannot 
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acquiesce in this view. Not only did the witnesses 
deny that they took such an element into consid-
eration, but the question propounded to them 
speeifically excluded such an assun1ption. \Y e 
agree with the referee that the hypothetical ques-
tion was free fron1 the objections condemned by 
the court of appeals in the former appeal. As 
said by him, it •included no element of good will 
and no assumption that the operation of this 
property would produce certain profits during the 
period of many years.' Respondent's "·itnesses 
did take into consideration, and they ·were justi-
fied in so doing, the value of the trap rock and 
the profitable operation of the plant. Certainly 
a prospective purchaser and a seller would have 
in 1nind a possibility of profit to be derived from 
the operation of the plant. It was not an assump-
tion of profitable operation, but an assu1nption 
of fixed profit oyer a period of years which the 
Court of .Appeals rejected. X owhere in the opin-
ion of .Judge Loughran is there any intimation 
that the court intended to exclude from considera-
tion the possibility of profitable operation. The 
condmnnation of the fonner judg1nent in the high-
est court \Yas based not upon a profit but upon an 
invariable profit oYer 'decades to con1e' * * * 
"In e1ninent dmnain proceedings, one who is 
deprived of his property should he pennitted to 
prove all factors which are rele,.,.ant in fixing its 
value. There i~ no well considered case which 
holds that profib 1nay neYer be considered as an 
as an element of value. Profits nwy be reeognized 
as an in1portant item, and are only excluded in 
eaf'f's "~here the evidence is too speculative. Each 
easp 1H'ee~saril~- inYolYes different facts and n1ust 
be considered by itself. Only a few general rules 
appl~· on the question of valuation in conde1nna-
28 
'I 
j 
1 j 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tion proceedings, and even these Inay yield to 
exceptional circu1nstances (cases cited). The us-
able value of property for any suitable legitimate 
business is always relevant in fixing its market 
value (cases cited). But it is the potentialities 
of .a given piece of property, both develped and 
undeveloped which constitute its chief element of 
value. The value of trap rock and the reasonable 
probabilities of the profit to be derived therefrom 
are elements which may be assumed a prospective 
purchaser would take into account in fixing the 
value which he would be willing to give for the 
property * * * ." 
The court indicated that the fact that the owner 
purchased the property in 1909 for $18,000.00, was un-
impressive for the reason that "no plans had been per-
fected for turning this barren land into a trap rock 
quarry whereby its value might be greatly increased, in 
1909 * * *" 
\Ye respectfully submit that the final determination 
of the cause in thP 8JNlrki11 Realty Corp v. State case 
could well change the views of Orgel and the Orleans 
case. HO\n•ver, in citing the Spwrkhill case, we do not 
mean to concede that the element of the profit was con-
sidered in any re~ 1 )f'd in establishing the market value 
of the Jn·opert~,, since, in fact, the element of profit was 
specifically Pxduderl. 
POINT VI 
CASES CITED IN THE OPINION OF THE COURT ARE 
DISTINGUISHABLE FROM FACTS Oli' THE INSTANT 
CASE. 
In the case of Searle z:. tlw J.~ackrnranJHl & Blooms-
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burg Railroad Company, 33 Pennsylvania, page 57, cited 
in the opinion and quoted by Nichols on page 248, this is 
a case in 1857, wherein the railroad was condemning 
lands which ran acros.s unopened and undeveloped coal 
1nines, and the court indicated that these undeveloped 
coal lands were commonly sold by the acre. The follo·wing 
excerpts are significant: 
"But so far as regards the unopened coal 
veins on the land, \Ve may treat the case as one of 
wild lands ... " 
''In relation to the wild lands, such operations 
are no present injury, except in a purely imagin-
ary sense. * * * '~ 
The case of Reifer v. State Highu·ay Conun·ission, 
177 K. 683, 281 P. 2d 1080, is a case wherein the court 
cites Federal District Court cases in support of its de-
cision. The Federal District Court case cited were the 
r:nited States 1"·· Indian Creek Jiarble Co., 40 Federal 
Bupple1nent 81 l and Cnited States ·z:. Fire Acres of Land, 
50 Federal Supplement 69. The Indian Creek l\[arble 
ease as heretofore noted was merely a memorandum by 
the District Judge in advising commissioners on n1ethods· 
of establishing valuation. 
rrhe Heiter case differs frmn the instant case in 
the follovling p.articulars: 
a. In the Reiter case, the Highway Connnission 
n1ade timely objection to the testimony of the witneS:Ses 
as to the value of the land based upon the sand and gravel, 
which objections were overruled by the trial c.ourt. 
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b. There was no evidence that the sand would ever 
be mined or marketed. 
c. In the Reiter case, three of the witnesses arrived 
at the valuation based upon the quantity of sand under 
the land and the price received for the .sand when it w.as 
sold. In the instant case, the witnesses for the respond-
ents testified as to the value of the whole land taking 
into consideration the existence of the sand and gravel 
and the testimony as to the value of the sand and gravel 
as it lay in place; in the instant case the jury was ap-
prised 1nany times during trial that they were to find 
the value of the land .and not necessarily the va] ue of 
the sand; for example, during the testimony of :Mr. 
Gaddis, :Jfr. Gaddis in explaining the basis of his apprais-
al began to indicate a value of the sand and gravel 
wherein the court interrupted as follows : 
THE COURT: 
"Just a moment, that value is what these 
witnesses said it was worth in place, but that 
doesn't say what you could sell the property for 
with that much in place. 
A. That is true. 
THE COUHT: Your problem is what it would 
sell for under the conditions that :Mr. l\faw de-
scribed of a willing seller and a willing buyer (R. 
278) ." 
rrhe opinion quotes from Nichols on Eminent Do-
main from page ~4:3, and the first quotation ends with 
the phrase 'value of the land.' Nichols goes on to say 
right after that ''If a piece of land contains valuable im-
provements, those improvements apart from the land 
31 
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may not be considered. But certainly the character, na-
ture, .and extent of the improvements and the revenue 
derived therefrom are as essential to be considered in 
.arriving at the value of the land as the land itself or the 
uses to which it may be put." 
POINT VII 
THE APPELLANT HAVING FAILED TO OBJECT TO 
EVIDENCE OR INSTRUCTIONS PERTAINING TO THE 
SAND & GRAVEL AT TRIAL, THE APPELLATE COURT 
SHOULD NOT CONSIDER OBJECTIONS RAISED FOR 
FIRST TI:i.VIE UPON APPEAL. 
At the time of trial, the appellant rnade no obiec-
tion that tht- respondents were endeavoring to establish 
the valne of the land hy n1ultiplying the quantity of sand 
by the price per ton. In fact, the appellant santioned the 
type of evidence offered by the respondent in that the 
appellant's '"itnt·~:-:e~ the1nselves arrived at their opin-
ion of the n1arket value by detern1ining the quantity of 
sand and its value in place. If there was any error in 
admitting the evidence or if the evidence was in1proper, 
the objection being made for the first tune upon appeal 
shon1d not be considered by the .appellate court. 
In the ca~e of Petti11.r;ill r. Perkins, ~ Ftah 2d 266, 
:.!7:.! P. :Z(1 1 ~;·), this court held: 
'.:l..'. 
''ln order that a party rnay take advantage 
of an error in instructions connnitted bY the trial 
court, he rnust rnake a proper o bjectio~. 53 ~\m. 
Jur. P. 606. Generally. appellate eourts will not 
review .a ground of objection not urged in the trial 
court. 3. An1. J ur. 116, Appeal and Error, 381. 
The dnt~· is incurnbent upon c:ounsel to give the 
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trial court the opportunity to correct the error be-
fore asking the appellate court to reverse a ver-
dict and judgment thereon. Furthermore, it is 
well e,stablished that a party cannot assign as 
error the giving of his own requests. He cannot 
lead the court into error .and then be heard to 
complain thereof. To permit such action would 
needlessly prolong litigation, so there might never 
be an end thereto. Having by his own pleadings, 
evidence, and instruction tried and rested the case 
upon the theory that the mother's negligenee 
would bar the f.ather, he is bound thereby, as the 
law of the case. He cannot now on appeal shift 
his theory and position.'' 
POINT VIII 
RESPONDENTS RESPECTFULLY REQUEST INFOR-
MATION UPON INQUIRIES. 
The respondent re~pt>(·tfully requests the court to 
advise respondents upon the following inquiries: 
a. The opinion state:-: that "the land must be valued 
as land with the sand and gravel given due consideration 
as a eomponent part of the land and evidence of the 
amount, quality and value of the sand and gravel may be 
considered." 
\Vould it he proper for the re~pondent to give evi-
dence of the .amount, quality and value of the sand; 
then \vithout gi Ying t5pecifie testimony of the market 
value of the land, allmv the jury themselves to fix the 
market value of the land H('('ording to the instructions 
of the court. 
b. Is there an~' necessit:~ that witrwi-1:-;t>~ testify as 
to the 1narket value of the whole tract or is it sufficient 
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that evidence be presented which describes the tract, its 
uses, and the value of its component parts, then allow 
the jury to fix the overall value. 
c. The expert appraisers arrived at their valuations 
hy considering the value of the component parts, for 
exan1ple, :Jlr. Solomon, (R. -+77 to R. 493) testified that 
he arrived at his appraisal hy considering the valuation 
of the frontage property for .a depth of 200 feet, by con-
siderartion of the value of the sand and gravel area, and 
by consideration of the i1nprovements on the property. 
The improve1nents he examined were a laundry room, a 
water heater, a repair shop, a brick residence, an antique 
shop, meters, sewage disposals and trailer stalls; the 
hmne, he found, had a depreciated replacement value of 
$10,797.00, the laundry room, $1,920.00, the antique re-
pair shop $1878.00, the antique shop, $3,532.00 and 32 
aprons for use for trailer court, $3,200.00, etc. He then 
used the aggregate of these values in detennining his 
market value. Should there be any difference in arriving 
at the value of the land with improvements upon it by 
considering the value of the land and the value of the 
improvements in arriving at one value for both the land 
and improvements, than in detennining the value of land 
containing valuable sand and gravel by arriving at the 
value of the land by considering the value of the land 
and the value of the 1uinerals in it and then detennining 
one value for the land with the in1provements. 
d. If the opinion of the expert were that the 1narket 
value of the land wpre~ in fad. the aggregate value of 
ib co1nponent parts, and that this aggreg·ate value were 
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$270~000.00, but the reviewing court did not feel that this 
appraisal was supported by the evidence, then how much 
less than $270,000.00 would the evidence support. 
POINT IX 
THE TRIAL COURT DENIED A MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL AND ENTERED .JUDGMENT UPON THE VERDI·CT. 
The plaintiff nwved for a new trial for the reason, 
among others, that the evidence was insufficient to sup-
port the verdict of the jury. The court, after argument 
upon the motion denied the motion and entered judgment 
upon the jury verdict. This court has repeatedly refused 
to grant a new trial where the district court has denied 
a motion for new trial. 
The rule was stated in James L:. Robertson, 39 Ft. 
-tl -±, 117 Pac. 1068, which held in part as follows: 
'"vVhile the district court, in the exercise of a 
sound legal discretion, without basing his ruling 
upon any specific error of law may, under certain 
circumstances, possess the authority to grant a 
new trial, yet we cannot do so, nor can we exercise 
the discretion which the district court might, and 
in .some cases perhaps ought to have exercised. 
In cases like the one before us, where all other 
assignments fail, and the only available assign-
ment is that the evidence does not justify the ver-
dict of the jury, and where the trial court has re-
fused to grant a new trial, all that we are author-
ized to do is to look into the evidence to ascertain 
whether there is any substantial evidence in sup-
port of every material element, which plaintiff 
is required to establish in order to recover. If 
there is such evidence, then, so far a.s we are con-
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cerned, the verdict must stand, although in our 
judgrnent if we passed on the facts, the verdict 
upon the whole evidence should have been to the 
contrary. Nor can we, under the guise of review-
ing an abuse of discretion by the trial court in 
refusing to grant a new trial upon the ground that 
the verdict is not supported by the evidence, pas:s 
upon the weight of the evidence. What the district 
judge might, or even should have done in this re-
gard we may not do for him, sirnply because he 
refused to do it.'' 
A review of the authorities on this point i.s contained 
in the opinion of this court in :Jioser v. Z.C.~I.I., 197 Pac. 
2d, 136, wherein it wa~ said: 
;.It is a matter now too \vell settled to admit 
of any serious dispute (and appellants do not con-
tend otherwise) that the question of granting or 
denying a motion for new trial is a rnatter largely 
within the discretion of the trial court. \\l1ite \. 
1Jnion Pacific Railroad Co., 8 rt. 56, 29 P. 1030; 
Yan Dyke v. Ogden Savings Bank, 48 rt. 606, 
161 P. 50; Utah State X ational Bank v. Living-
ston, 69 rt. 284, 25-t P. 781: Thornpson Y. Brown 
Live Stock Co., 7-1: rt. 1, 276 P. 651: Jensen Y. 
Logan City, 89 rt. 347, 57 P. 2d. 708. This rule 
applies whether the rnotion is based upon insuffi-
ciency of the evidence or upon newly discovered 
evidenee. See eases above cited and \r aliotis v. 
l Ttah Apex ~fining· Co., 55 l~t. 131. 1 ~-+ P. so~: 
Greco v. Gentile, SS rt. :255. 33 P. :2d 1155: and 
rrrirnble Y. llnion Pacific. Stag-e~. 105 rt. -!;)7. 1-t~ 
P. 2d 67 4. rr'his eourt cannot substitute its discre-
tion for that of the trial court. J ame.s ,.:. Robert-
son, 39 Ft. 41-!-, 117 P. 1068, :2 X.C.C.~-\. 782. \Ye 
do not ordinarilv interfere with ruling·s of the trial 
court in Pither granting or denying 'a nwtion for 
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new trial, and unless abuse of, or failure to exer-
cise discretion on the part of the trial judge is 
quite clearly shown, the ruling of the trial judge 
will be sustained. Lehi Irrigation Co. v. Moyle, 
et al., 4 Ut. 327, 9 P. 867; White v. Union Pacific 
Ry. Co., supra; Utah State National Bank v. 
Livingston, and Trimble v. Union Pacific Stages, 
supra. *** 
''The rule in this jurisdiction, early laid down 
by this court, is that where a motion for new trial 
is based upon insufficiency of the evidence to sup-
port the verdi0t, the trial court will not be held 
to have abused its discretion in denying the mo-
tion unless there is not substantial evidence in the 
record to support the verdict. Fnited States v. 
Brown, 6 Ut. 115, 21 P. 461; James v. Robertson, 
39 Ut. 414, 117 P. 1068, 2 N.C.C.A. 78:2. Therefore, 
if reasonable minds could have found as the ;jury 
did in this case, from the evidence before it, then 
we cannot say that the trial court abu.sed its dis-
cretion in denying plaintiff's motion for new trial 
on the grounds of insufficiency of the evidence to 
support the verdict." 
In concJuding the court said: 
"And the jury having determined this ques-
tion in plaintiff's favor, and the trial court having 
denied defendants' motion for new trial, this court 
cannot sav that the trial court abused its discre-
tion un]e~s there wa~ no substantial evidence to 
support the verdict, or in other words, that all 
reasonable minds must agree that it was plaintiff 
and not defendant Rogers, who transgressed the 
center line of the highway.'' 
Further, in rptown Appliance & Radio Co., Inc. v. 
Flint, et al., 249 Pac. 2d S2G, this court said: 
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"Jury trials are a part of the fundamental 
tenets of our judicial system .and where, as in this 
case a litigant has fully, completely, and without 
restraint been permitted to show his full griev-
ance to a jury and they have conscientiously and 
without any showing of prejudice or other extran-
eous influences decided the 1natter there 1nust be 
some basic .and compelling reason so inherent in 
the evidence that the trial judge ':\.rould be war-
ranted in placing his ;judgn1ent as to the result 
to be reached over and above that of the jury. 
"'A court, vacating a verdict and granting .a 
new trial by merely setting up his opinion or 
judgment against the constitutional trial by jury.' 
Jensen v. Denver & Rio Grande Railroad Com-
pany, 44 Ut. 100, 138 P. 1185, 1192." 
In the instant c.ase. the plaintiff had eYer~- oppor-
tunity to place before the jury all evidence of value of 
the property and was permitted on cross exmnination to 
disclose in detail how the respondents' witnesses arrived 
at their evidence of value. The jury over a period of 
41h days had .an opportunity to consider all elements 
which go to determining value and appear to have been 
fully advised a;;; to the contentions of both the respondent 
and appellant on 1natters concerning value. The jury 
verdict of $150,000, certainly is supported by evidence 
of v;alue and there is no indication that the jury arriYed 
at its verdict by any other than a proper fonnula, and it 
would see1n that the respondent should at least be entitled 
to this inferrence. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondents re.spectfully urge the court to recon-
sider its opinion in the light of giving the respondents 
the benefit of ever~~ intendment of the evidence; in elimi-
nating from consideration matter::) raised for the first 
time on appeal; in giving due consideration to the find-
ings of the jury and the trial court, and in eliminating 
from consideration of so 1nuch of Nichols and Orgel and 
other opinions which are based upon minority or super-
ceded law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HERBERT B. J\fA \V 
W:B~NDELL B. HAJ\1MOND 
GEORGE IL FADEZ 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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